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Abstract
Pesticide application is increasing and despite extensive educational programs farmers continue to take
high health and environmental risks when applying pesticides. The structured mental model approach
(SMMA) is a new method for risk perception analysis. It embeds farmers' risk perception into their
livelihood system in the elaboration of a mental model (MM). Results from its first application are
presented here. The study region is Vereda la Hoya (Colombia), an area characterized by subsistence
farming, high use of pesticides, and a high incidence of health problems. Our hypothesis was that
subsistence farmers were constrained by economic, environmental, and sociocultural factors, which
consequently should influence their mental models. Thirteen experts and 10 farmers were interviewed
and their MMs of the extended pesticide system elicited. The interviews were open-ended with the
questions structured in three parts: (i) definition and ranking of types of capital with respect to their
importance for the sustainability of farmers' livelihood; (ii) understanding the system and its dynamics;
and (iii) importance of the agents in the farmers' agent network. Following this structure, each part of
the interview was analyzed qualitatively and statistically. Our analyses showed that the mental models
of farmers and experts differed significantly from each other. By applying the SMMA, we were also
able to identify reasons for the divergence of experts' and farmers' MMs. Of major importance are the
following factors: (i) culture and tradition; (ii) trust in the source of information; and (iii) feedback on
knowledge.
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System Perspectives of Experts and Farmers Regarding the
Role of Livelihood Assets in Risk Perception: Results from
the Structured Mental Model Approach
Regina Schoell1∗ and Claudia R. Binder1
Pesticide application is increasing and despite extensive educational programs farmers con-
tinue to take high health and environmental risks when applying pesticides.
The structured mental model approach (SMMA) is a new method for risk perception
analysis. It embeds farmers’ risk perception into their livelihood system in the elaboration of
a mental model (MM). Results from its first application are presented here. The study region
is Vereda la Hoya (Colombia), an area characterized by subsistence farming, high use of pes-
ticides, and a high incidence of health problems. Our hypothesis was that subsistence farmers
were constrained by economic, environmental, and sociocultural factors, which consequently
should influence their mental models.
Thirteen experts and 10 farmers were interviewed and their MMs of the extended pesti-
cide system elicited. The interviews were open-ended with the questions structured in three
parts: (i) definition and ranking of types of capital with respect to their importance for the
sustainability of farmers’ livelihood; (ii) understanding the system and its dynamics; and (iii)
importance of the agents in the farmers’ agent network. Following this structure, each part
of the interview was analyzed qualitatively and statistically. Our analyses showed that the
mental models of farmers and experts differed significantly from each other.
By applying the SMMA, we were also able to identify reasons for the divergence of
experts’ and farmers’ MMs. Of major importance are the following factors: (i) culture and
tradition; (ii) trust in the source of information; and (iii) feedback on knowledge.
KEYWORDS: Culture; farmers; mental models; pesticides; trust
1. INTRODUCTION
Pesticide misuse and its related health and en-
vironmental problems in less developed countries
is a widely discussed issue. Since the green revo-
lution, the use of chemical inputs per hectare, that
is, fertilizers and pesticides, has been substantially
1Department of Geography, University of Zuerich.
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cial and Industrial Ecology, Department of Geography, Uni-
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Switzerland; tel: ++41 1 635 52 32; fax: ++41 44 635 6848;
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increasing.(1,2) The effect on productivity has been
considerable: it is estimated that if pesticides are
properly applied, crop losses can be reduced by about
40%.(3)
However, pesticides have not only had posi-
tive effects. Misuse of pesticides can lead to se-
vere environmental and human health effects.(4,5)
Whereas in developed countries the environmental
impacts are of major concern (fish toxicity, soil dam-
age), in developing countries increased mortality and
morbidity of humans due to exposure to pesticides
are experts’ main issues of concern.(2) For exam-
ple, Richardson(3) found that the misuse of pesticides
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causes a higher incidence of child cancer. Pesticide
producers and appliers suffer more often than the lo-
cal population from peripheral neuritis (>40%), psy-
chiatric manifestations (>40%), electroencephalo-
graphic (EEG) changes (>25%), and hepatorenal
dysfunction (>80%).(6) Additionally, it is assumed
that there may also be indirect and long-term impacts
of pesticide misuse, such as lower life expectancy
and decreasing soil productivity, which would affect
farmers’ livelihood persistently.
Misuse of pesticides in developing countries re-
lates to (i) lack of adequate protection during the
mixture and application procedure; (ii) inadequate
storage facilities; (iii) a higher amount and frequency
of application than in developed countries; and (iv)
the application of stronger products often forbidden
in developed countries.(1,2,7)
Studies have mostly focused on understanding
which variables might influence pesticide application
behavior. For example, land ownership and access
to credit increase pesticide use,(8) whereas increased
education and wealth of farmers seem to result in
reduced pesticide use or even the adoption of in-
tegrated pest management practices.(9) In contrast,
Swinton(10) found that wealthier farmers in Latin
America, even though they had the financial capac-
ity to use pesticides more appropriately (less toxic
pesticides, better equipment), did not do so. They
hypothesized that this was because farmers lacked
incentives to perform good pesticide stewardship.
Abdulai and Binder(11) showed for the case of
Nicaragua that farmers’ decisions on the amount of
pesticides applied also significantly depend on earlier
managerial decisions made, such as burning or not
burning the crop residues on the field. This finding is
important as it shows that farmers do include their
system knowledge when making decisions. Ryder(12)
also confirmed this finding by showing that farmers in
the Dominican Republic had an unsophisticated soil
taxonomy based on their empirical knowledge of site
characteristics that could be related to a scientific site
suitability rating.
Because of the above-mentioned health and en-
vironmental effects of pesticide misuse, the interna-
tional community and the chemical companies have
made substantial investments and developed educa-
tional programs to reduce the misuse of pesticides;
however, they have not had the expected success.
One of the reasons is that to a large extent farm-
ers’ perception of risks related to pesticide use has
neither been investigated, nor included in the devel-
opment of educational programs. Additionally, pes-
ticide misuse has never been put in relation to other
types of risks affecting farmers’ livelihood. Even
though several authors have emphasized that risk
perception or risk strategies have to be studied in
relation to farmer livelihood and the system knowl-
edge of farmers, the focus is still mostly on specific
risks, such as environmental risks, for example, soil
erosion.(2–4) Thus, we consider that farmers’ risk per-
ception1 should be investigated and farmers’ percep-
tion of pesticide risk compared to the perception of
the other risks they confront.
When studying farmers’ risk perception one has
to analyze, first, which aspects constitute a specific
risk perception, and, second, which factors influence
risk perception. Regarding the first, farmers’ risk
perception consists of two important, interrelated
aspects: first, farmers’ reasoning about the risks of
pesticide application per se; and second, farmers’
balancing of pesticide risks against other livelihood
risks, such as financial and natural risks, in their ev-
eryday life. Second, farmers’ risk perception is influ-
enced by (1) the social structure they are embedded
in, including culture, traditions, belief systems, and
tacit and explicit norms;(13–15) (2) the assets and the
capabilities they have access to;(16–18) and (3) the so-
cial network they are embedded in.(19–22)
To account for the aspects of risk perception
and the influences on farmers’ risk perception Binder
and Scho¨ll developed the structural mental model
approach (SMMA).(16) SMMA(16) combines the
mental models approach (MMA)(23–25) with the
livelihood approach.(26) It allows the inclusion of
farmers’ livelihood in the analysis of their mental
models (MM),(27,28) discriminating among different
values of thinking and conceptualizing.
In this article, the first empirical application of
the SMMA is presented for the case of pesticide man-
agement in Vereda la Hoya, Boyaca, Colombia. By
doing so, we aim at:
(1) analyzing farmers’ and experts’ discrepant
MMs of their risk perception of pesticide
management within the livelihood context of
farmers;
(2) exploring the causes of discrepancies between
MMs of experts and farmers; and
(3) analyzing inappropriate pesticide manage-
ment with respect to risk communication.
1Definition of perception: Perception is the process of acquiring,
interpreting, selecting, and organizing information.(23)
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The article is structured as follows. We first de-
scribe the study area. We then describe the interview
subjects and the specific application of SMMA to
pesticide use risks. In Section 4, we present the out-
come of SMMA application, structured into the three
characteristic SMMA parts. Ultimately, we summa-
rize and discuss the results in terms of further impli-
cations, limitations of the method, relevance for pol-
icy making, and further research.
2. STUDY AREA
The selected study area, Vereda la Hoya, is lo-
cated in the rural part of Tunja, the capital of the De-
partamento de Boyaca´ (Colombia). La Hoya ranges
from 2,700 to 3,250 masl over an area of 8 km2
(840 ha), has an average temperature of 12◦C, and
a population of about 747 inhabitants (130 families).
The main source of income is farming. Farmers culti-
vate minifundios, that is, their property has an aver-
age size of 6.6 ha.(29,30) The land use pattern is crop
production 40%, animal husbandry 25%, fallow land
33%, and forest 2%. The main agricultural products
grown in la Hoya are: potato 27%, vetch (carrots)
23%, corn 18%, horse bean 18%, wheat 9%, and
onion 5%. Usually, the land is cultivated in two cy-
cles a year (September to February and March to
August), which permits two harvesting seasons,
February and August. The typical rotation consists
of 2–3 cycles of potato, 1–2 cycles of carrots, and 2–4
cycles of fallow land.
In Colombia, agriculture accounts for 21% of the
GNP and 40% of the labor force.(31,32) It has been
estimated that the amount of pesticides used per year
is about 40,000 tons.(33)
Potato production in la Hoya is vulnerable
to three major pests, the soil-dwelling larvae of
the Andean weevil (Premnotrypes vorax, “Gusano
blanco”), the late blight fungus (Phytophthora infes-
tans, “Gota”), and Guatemalan potato moth (Tecia
solanivora, “Polilla Guatemaleca”). For the control
of these pests both farmers and agricultural sci-
entists consider the use of both insecticides and
fungicides necessary. Up to 12 applications of each
are required.(34) In this study region, the predom-
inant pesticide used for potato production is car-
bofuran (an insecticide and nematicide; potential
health effect: respiratory system failure) followed
by mancozeb (a fungicide; potential health effect:
sensitization rashes) and methamidophos (an insec-
ticide; potential health effect: delayed neurological
problems).(29,35–39)
3. METHODS
3.1. The Subjects
To collect data for the SMMA, interviews were
conducted with 13 experts and 10 local farmers.
3.1.1. Experts
The sample of 13 experts consisted of 5 females
and 8 males, half of them were between 30 and
40 years old while the rest were between 40 and
50. The expert group included a mixture of pro-
fessionals from different scientific fields of the sys-
tem being analyzed (Binder & Scho¨ll, submitted):
pesticide producers: that is, pesticide sellers, rep-
resentatives from governmental technical assistance
institutes and health ministries, a toxicologist, a med-
ical doctor, economists, and an agronomist. Two of
them had been locally involved, five had a regional
perspective, and six worked at a national level (see
Table I).
The 10 experts differed in the following criteria:
(i) knowledge of the local, regional, or national sys-
tem; (ii) expertise in different aspects of the liveli-
hood system; (iii) hypothesized position within farm-
ers’ agent network.
3.1.2. Farmers
The 10 farmers interviewed were all male and
between 24 and 40 years old. From earlier stud-
ies,(34,40) we know that men are the key decision-
makers concerning pesticide use and, moreover, the
ones applying pesticides in the field. Therefore, we
performed the interviews only with men. The sam-
ple was selected by purposeful sampling, includ-
ing individuals from different parts of the study re-
gion, who differed in the levels of their livelihood
capitals (human, natural, financial, and social) (see
Table II).
During the farmers’ interview, we observed a
drop-off of new concepts after 4–5 farmers. In agree-
ment with Maharik,(41) we completed the farmers’
sample with 10 participants.
3.2. The SMMAMethod
The SMMA developed in Binder and Scho¨ll(16)
was applied in this research following the three an-
alytical steps of the method (Table III). In con-
trast to other livelihood analyses, the application of
the SMMA in the context of pesticide management
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Table I. Overview of Experts Interviewed
Age (Years) Gender Education Profession Working Entity
30–40 f Agricultural engineer Pesticide seller Regional level
40–50 m Agronomist Pesticide seller National level
30–40 f Toxicologist Laboratory technician National Health Institutea
40–50 m Chemist Laboratory technician National Health Institutea
40–50 m Economist Professor Universityb
40–50 m Secretary (with toxicology
background)
Public servant Ministry of Healthc
30–40 f Microbiologist Laboratory technician National Health Institutea
30–40 f Agronomist Private technical assistance Independent regional cooperation of Boyacad
30–40 m Agricultural engineer Professor Universitye
30–40 m Agricultural engineer Public technical assistance Municipal entity of agricultural technical assistancef
40–50 f Medical doctor Pesticide stewardship Syngenta
40–50 m Economist Professor Universitye
40–50 m Medical doctor Medical doctor Hospital St. Catalina
aInstituto Nacional de Salud, INS.
bUniversidad de los Andes, Bogota.
cMinisterio de Proteccion Social, MPS.
dCorporacio´n Auto´noma Regional, CORPOBOYACA.
eUNIBOYACA, Tunja.
fUnidad Municipal de Asistencia Te´cnica Agropecuaria, UMATA.
Table II. Overview of Capital States of the Interviewed Farmers
Capitala High (State) Low (State)
Human Education: 8 years of primary school Education: no formal education
Health No specificationb No specificationb
Natural Soil: fertile soils Soil: less fertile soils
Inclination: low Inclination: high
Forest: owns land with natural forest Forest: does not own any land with natural forest
Financial 10 ha of own land Landless farm worker
Social Social status: community leader Social status: isolated member of community
aCovering the livelihood of farmers, see Section 3 for definition.
bAs there was no information about health effects related to inappropriate pesticide use, the farmers could not be selected with respect to
their differences in health capital state.
Table III. The Structured Mental Model Approach (SMMA)
Livelihood Aspects Risk Aspects
Experts’ Interview Farmers’ Interview Considered Considered
Part I • Listing of relevant
capital group elements
• Grouping of the elements in the
four capitals groups
• Definition of human, health,
natural, and financial capital
• Origin of differences in risk
knowledge
• Weighting of the capitals • Weighting of the capitals • Risk-balancing (tradeoffs),
difference in importance
Part II • Showing how the
elements are related
• Answering open-ended
questions on the relations found
by the experts
• Explanation of dynamics
among human, health,
natural, and financial capital
• Origins of difference in risk
perception
Part III • Listing the relevant
system agents
• Designing an agents network
with the agents listed by the
experts
• Definition of the social
capital
• Agents and their role in
successful interventions
• Designing an agents
network
• Explanation of relations
within the social capital
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Table IV. Example of Element Consolidation and Photographic Representation
Elements Named by Experts Consolidated Element Regional Relation Photograph
Regional hospital
• Hospital → Medical treatment → Regional hospital people →
• Private clinic can and will go to
• SISBEN (public health insurance)
requires that health capital is considered as a sepa-
rate capital to optimally analyze the perceptions con-
cerning health and health risks.
3.3. Analysis
The results of the SMMA were analyzed and
structured according to the three steps of the method.
In each of the interview parts, answers from the ex-
pert interviews were summarized to make a single ex-
pert model and the different answers of the farmers
were compared to that. This way of proceeding orig-
inates from the MMA(24) method.
3.3.1. Analysis Part I
In Part I, experts were asked to name impor-
tant characteristic elements of the exemplified four
capitals: human, health, natural, and financial cap-
ital.(16) Afterward, they were asked to rank these
capitals in order of importance to farmer livelihood.
From the most frequently named elements of the
capital definition, pictures were taken in the field
and used for the farmer interviews (see example in
Table IV). Farmers had to first define the element
HUMAN CAPITAL
STATE  1
HEALTH CAPITAL
STATE 2
FINANCIAL CAPITAL
STATE  4
NATURAL CAPITAL
STATE 3
HUMAN CAPITAL 
HEALTH CAPITAL FINANCIAL CAPITAL 
NATURAL CAPITAL 
1.2 
2.1 
4.1 
1.4 
3.4 
4.3 2.3 
3.2 
4.2 
3.1 
1.3 
2.4 
Fig. 1. System overview: Default (left), system dynamics analysis scheme (right).
represented in the picture by explaining what they
saw in each picture and second place it in a capital
group, explaining their choice. The expert and farmer
results were summarized in a table (see Section 4 and
Table VIII).
3.3.2. Analysis Part II
In Part II, the system dynamics were analyzed.
The experts were asked to draw and discuss a system
dynamic graph from a blank system picture (Fig. 1
left). In order to obtain a common experts’ system
dynamic model, the resulting 13 graphs were com-
bined into a single graph. Each capital was numbered
(human = 1, health = 2, natural = 3, and financial =
4).
Expert and farmer system dynamics explana-
tions were summarized by capital in: (a) capital state
(e.g., human capital state = S1); (b) capital effect
(e.g., effects of human on health capital = 1.2; see
Fig. 1, right).
The capital state and effect nomenclature was
also used to structure and relate each question of
farmers’ open-ended interviews to the specific sys-
tem dynamic aspect (see Table V, rightmost column).
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Table V. Open-Ended Questions Related to System Dynamic Explanations of Experts Posed to Farmers in Part II of the SMMA
State or System
Related Capital Questions Relation
Human capital What happens if the harvest is affected by pests and climatic conditions? 1.3
Have you noticed a change of climate over the past years? S3
Who (or whom) do you ask for help when the harvest is affected? S1 1.3
Did your parents also cultivate potatoes? S1 1.3
What other crops did they cultivate? 1.3 1.4 3.1
How have the cultivation techniques changed with respect to the ones your parents used? 1.3 1.4 3.1
How did you learn to deal with pests . . . S1 1.3 3.1
. . . with pesticides. . . S1
. . . types of pesticides. . . S1 3.4
. . . biologic crop protection? S1
How do you protect yourself when you mix and apply pesticides? 1.2 2.1
Health capital What do you do if you feel sick? 1.2 4.2 2.4
. . . while applying pesticides? 2.1 1.2
. . . nausea after applying pesticides? 2.1 1.2
Natural capital How do you judge the quality of your soil? S3 3.1
Has it changed since you started to cultivate potatoes/ carrots? 3.1 S3
What kind of crop rotation do you carry out? S1
. . . and why? 1.3
What pests are you confronted with? S3 3.1
What effect do you think pesticides have on plants . . . 1.3
. . . on the soil? 1.3
. . . on natural abundance in the fields? 1.3
. . . on water? 1.3 3.2
. . . on your health? 1.2 3.2
. . . on biodiversity? 1.3
Financial capital How good is the current price of potatoes and/or carrots? S4
What do the prices depend on? 1.4 3.4 4.3
What would you do if you had more/less money? 4.3 4.1 4.2
Agent 1  
Agent 2  
Farmer 
Agent 3  
1/Y 
2/Y 
2/Y 
3/Y 
3/Y 
until either Y/Y=1 
or the agent is  
excluded from the 
network value=1.2 
[Y is the maximal number 
of agents in a direct chain 
(e.g., line network-> Y=9)] 
Y=1 
Y=2  
Y=3 
Agent 5  
Agent 4  
Fig. 2. Agent network analysis.
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Table VI. Examples of Photographic Representation of the Selected Agents
Named Agent by Experts In Field Representation Photograph
Junta
Junta (Famers’ Union) → Who is a member or even the president →
of the junta of Vereda la Hoya
Farmers’ questions were asked in random order in
each interview.
The questions were asked in random order in
each interview. For comparing the experts’ and the
farmers’ statements, we used a qualitative interpre-
tative approach as described by Morgan.(24)
Finally, the effect statements were analyzed re-
garding what each statement revealed about the per-
son’s risk-related perception of the mentioned effect.
Each statement was rated on a 4-level perception
scale revealing the significance of the statement in
terms of risk perception (no effect perceived: score 0;
effect perceived: score 1; effect explained: score 2; ef-
fect perceived is risk related: score 3). All experts’
and all farmers’ statements scorings were summa-
rized in an experts and a farmers table to obtain a
comparable overview of the statements.
3.3.3. Analysis Part III
In Part III of the interview, the agent networks
of experts and farmers were analyzed to account
for the social capital of farmers’ livelihood. The
agent network per se does not provide a direct in-
sight about information concerning pesticide man-
agement. It presents a general view about the agents
experts and farmers have in mind when providing
or inquiring information. The experts were asked to
name the relevant agents and to draw an agent net-
work. These agent networks were summarized and
the nine most frequently named agents by all experts
selected. Again, photographs of these nine agents
were taken and used for the farmer interviews (see
example in Table VI).
The farmers were asked to place the pho-
tographs of the agents nearer or further away from
themselves, constructing a personal agent network.
The farmers’ agent networks were analyzed accord-
ing to the agents’ distance from the farmer as shown
in Fig. 2.
4. RESULTS
In this section, the results highlighting the main
differences between experts’ and farmers’ mental
models with respect to risk perception of pesticide
use are presented. The results are again structured
according to the three parts of the SMMA inter-
views.
4.1. Part I: Definition and Weighting of Farmers’
Individual Capitals: The Monadic and
Set-Theoretic Model
Table VII shows the differences in capital defini-
tion between experts and farmers. Experts and farm-
ers agreed that culture and education belonged to
human capital, that medical doctors, the governmen-
tal health system SISBEN, and hospital belonged to
health capital, that environmental contamination and
forest affected or belonged to natural capital, and
that income, credit, market, and machinery belonged
to financial capital.
Of particular interest are the differences in the
set-theoretic model of the capitals.2
4.1.1. Human Capital
Regarding human capital, two major differences
were found. First, experts considered that techni-
cal assistance contributes to building farmers’ hu-
man capital, whereas farmers allocated technical as-
sistance to financial capital. The reason that 80%
of the farmers gave was that they perceived techni-
cal assistance to be directly linked to their financial
resources. In the region, wealthy farmers are more
likely than poorer ones to receive free technical assis-
tance from the state. Additionally, wealthier farmers
can afford and do pay for technical assistance, for ex-
ample, for soil analyses.
2Only issues relevant for livelihood and risk perception are dis-
cussed. Additional information will be delivered upon request.
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Market Farmer Government  
ICA 
UMATA 
Pesticide 
producer 
Pesticide 
seller 
Church University Union 
Fig. 3. Generalized expert’s agent network.
Table VII. Capital Definition by
Experts’ and Farmers’ Allocation of
These Elements to the Capital Groups
Farmers’ Element Allocation
to Capital Group
Experts Element Human Health Natural Financial
Human capital Culture 10
Education 9 1
Technical assistance 1 1 8
Religion 8 2
Health capital Hospital 10
SISBEN 10
Medical doctors 10
Alimentation 9 1
Herbal man 9 1
Family/kitchen 1 7 0 2
Fumigationa 5 4 1
Pesticide mixinge 5 3 2
Natural capital Environmental contamination 10
Forest 10
Infrastructureb 1 1 8
Biodiversity 7 3
Water 1 3 6
Pests treatmentc 1 6 3
Pests treatmentd 1 4 5
Financial capital Income 10
Credit (access) 10
Market 10
Machinery 10
Land size 1 6 3
House (size) 5 5
Farming (livestock) 2 8
aProtection while fumigating and mixing pesticides.
bTransport.
cGusano blance.
dPolilla guatemalteca.
ePesticide mixing.
Note: Large differences are shown in bold; fields in gray scale indicate expected placement.
Second, for experts, religion also was considered
part of human capital but, interestingly, for 20% of
the farmers it comprised part of their health capital.
Farmers believed that if they are faithful, God will
keep them sane, that is, God will reduce the health
risks that might occur when applying pesticides.
4.1.2. Health Capital
Overall, farmers considered health risks of pes-
ticide use to be lower than environmental risks of
pesticide use and placed the photographs of fumiga-
tion and pesticide mixing in natural capital (40% and
30%, respectively) instead of health capital. Farm-
ers justified this choice by emphasizing the environ-
mental risks of applying and not applying pesticides.
In contrast, experts placed fumigation and pesticide
mixing as elements defining the health capital of
farmers in the pesticide use context (Table VII).
4.1.3. Natural Capital
In the case of natural capital an overall
smaller discrepancy (compared with the other
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Table VIII. Different Weighting of Capital Groups
Farmers Ranking Experts Ranking of
Ranka of Own Capitals Farmers’ Capitals
1 Health capital Human capital
2 Financial capital Financial capital
3 Natural capital Natural capital
4 Human capital Health capital
a1 = most important; 4 = least important.
capital groups) between experts’ and farmers’ state-
ments was detected.
Concerning infrastructure/transport, experts de-
fined it as an element of natural capital, whereas 80%
of the farmers viewed the element as financial capi-
tal. To clarify this view, farmers argued that infras-
tructure is not sufficiently supplied by the state and
therefore has to be paid for by farmers themselves.
Furthermore, farmers’ financial risk increases with
lacking and insufficient infrastructure. For example,
“bad” road conditions reduce their access to mar-
kets, making them dependent on resellers who buy
directly from the farm, offering lower prices.
For experts pests such as gusano blanco and po-
lilla guatemalteca are “insects,” and as such are part
of natural capital. In contrast, farmers placed gusano
blanco (50%) and polilla guatemalteca (30%) as ele-
ments of financial capital, as they associated the pests
with high risks of harvest losses and the necessity of
costly chemical treatment to minimize these risks.
4.1.4. Financial Capital
In the financial group, farmers’ highest de-
viation from experts’ opinion was the element
house/housing. Interestingly, 50% of the farmers
agreed that the house is not a financial stock but a
place for meeting and talking. Furthermore, farmers
would not try to improve their housing conditions,
for example, by renovating their houses or investing
in extensions to their houses.3 Land size was placed
by 60% of the farmers as part of their natural capital.
This choice was explained by the fact that the more
land farmers have, the more natural capital farmers
feel they possess.
4.1.5. Weighting of the Individual Capitals
As presented in Binder and Scho¨ll,(16) the
weighting of the capitals provided first insight into
3It is important to note that the differences among farmers were
the highest throughout these statements.
the differences in risk perception between experts
and farmers. As documented in Table VIII, experts
weighted human capital highest, and health capital
lowest. Farmers prioritized health capital over all the
other capitals and considered human capital to be
the one of least importance. That is, experts consider
risks to human capital to be more relevant for farm-
ers’ livelihood, whereas farmers consider that if their
health is at risk, their whole livelihood might be jeop-
ardized.
This weighting difference can be explained by
the fact that experts consider themselves part of hu-
man capital, and thus, see themselves as important
drivers of the system. Furthermore, the difference
in definitions of health capital between experts and
farmers was the highest among the capital defini-
tions. As an argument for weighting the farmer’s
health capital as lowest in importance, experts men-
tioned that they had observed farmers not taking
care of their health and just going to the doctor in se-
vere cases. In contrast, farmers weighted health cap-
ital highest, arguing that without “good” health no
successful livelihood is possible.
4.2. Part II: Interaction and Dynamics Between the
Individual Capitals: The Relational Model
The following section summarizes the differ-
ences in experts’ and farmers’ statements concern-
ing the relational model of farmers’ livelihood. The
statements are organized by capital. They start with
differences in capital state followed by the effect
statements made (see Section 3).
4.2.1. Human Capital
4.2.1.1. State. In agreement with the capital weight-
ing, experts considered human capital to be the
driver for farmers’ livelihood system, impacting on
all other capitals of farmers’ livelihood. Thus, they
stated that all livelihood risks, including those from
pesticide application, could be lowered if human cap-
ital increased. They were convinced that farmers’ hu-
man capital is simpler but comparable to their own
and that it could be influenced (increased and de-
creased) to reduce livelihood risks mainly by educa-
tion, that is, training.
In contrast, farmers did not clearly perceive the
state of their human capital and were not even able
to explain the composition of their human capital.
The origin of their farming knowledge, however, was
quite clear to them. Eight of nine farmers said that
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their parents were their main source of informa-
tion (perpetuating traditions). If their parents did not
know how to deal with, for example, a pest problem,
8/94 stated that they would ask technical assistance
for advice. Yet, two farmers also stated that techni-
cians were not always trustworthy as a source of in-
formation as they tended to be subjective and unreli-
able.
Farmers’ perceptions concerning the necessity of
pesticide use seem to be driven by the change in crop
selection and cultivation practices. A group of farm-
ers argued that over time, due to decreasing crop va-
riety, the incidence of pests in the second cultivation
period of potatoes had been increasing. Regarding
pesticide use, all farmers (9/9) said that their fathers
used sulfur (“sulfato”) and lime (“cal”) for combat-
ing the pests. They claimed that the use of modern
pesticides was induced by the abandonment of or-
ganic fertilizers and pesticides.
Interestingly, both groups agreed that farmers
knew how to protect themselves when applying pes-
ticides, and both groups agreed that this information
was “received” and not “searched for,” which con-
trasts with the preferred information source of farm-
ers, namely, their father.
4.2.1.2. Effect statements: Human on natural. The
following statements show that experts did not
perceive the effect of human on natural capital to
be risk-related. Nevertheless these statements reveal
that experts can explain an effect from human on nat-
ural capital, scoring 2 in the risk perception matrix
(see Table IX).
Experts claimed that recommendations about
appropriate agricultural techniques would have im-
mediate visible effects on natural capital. Addition-
ally, they stated that farmers not only know their soils
(and what their soils need) but also know a great deal
about climatic conditions in their region. Some ex-
perts additionally argued that small farmers might re-
spect their soils mainly for traditional reasons rather
than technical knowledge.
Farmers’ statements reveal that farmers per-
ceived and were able to explain the risk related ef-
fect of human capital on natural capital. They were
even clear about how they would cope with the per-
ceived pest risks (i.e., influencing productivity), scor-
ing 3 (Table IX).
For example, farmers explained that they apply
a preventive dose of pesticides throughout every cul-
4Eight of nine farmers answered.
tivation cycle, following a risk minimization strategy
(with respect to productivity). In 8/9 cases, farmers
also argued that they immediately increased applica-
tion frequency upon noticing pest infestation; how-
ever, they avoided increasing pesticide concentration
because they feared harming the crop. This knowl-
edge was acquired through tradition.
Furthermore, when talking about crop rotation,
farmers mentioned similar types of rotations, each
finishing with a period of fallow land. The reason for
including a fallow period was reasoned with state-
ments like “the soil needs to rest and grass gives
it “strength” (4/9). The farmers mentioned noticing
that the soil got “tired” and “thinner” if they kept cul-
tivating potatoes and carrots continuously, thus in-
creasing the risks of productivity losses.
4.2.1.3. Human on health. Experts considered that
increasing human capital (i.e., understanding the
health effects of pesticide misuse) would lead to the
adoption of protection measures and thus increase
health capital (perception level 3).
Even though most farmers apparently had no-
ticed adverse health effects when applying pesticides,
they failed to relate the use of protection measures
to a reduction of health risks (scoring 1 in Table IX).
This is shown by the fact that eight of nine farmers
stated a direct or indirect effect related to pesticide
application. Four farmers (4/8) specified lungs, eyes,
respiratory system, and suffering from headache and
nausea during and after application. But none of
the farmers mentioned having noticed a reduction of
these effects when using protective equipment.
4.2.1.4. Human on financial. At least for wealthier
farmers, experts stated a positive effect of human
upon financial capital (score 2, Table IX). Experts
stated that wealthier farmers were better-educated
farmers, who know whom to trust and whom to
pay for technical support. They affirmed that edu-
cated farmers have a better position in their social
network, and therefore have better access to credit.
Their knowledge of the markets, furthermore, pro-
vides them with access to better prices.
Farmers did not mention any relationship be-
tween human and financial capital, which led to a
zero in the risk perception matrix (Table IX).
4.2.2. Health Capital
4.2.2.1. State. In the experts’ view the state of farm-
ers health is “bad and at risk” because of, among
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Table IX. Experts Versus Farmers Risk:
Perception for Each System
Dynamic Effect
Human Capital Health Capital Natural Capital Financial Capital
(E / F) (E / F) (E / F) (E / F)
Human capital 3 / 1 2 / 3 2 / 0
Health capital 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 3
Natural capital 0 / 3 1 / 3 2 / 2
Financial capital 3 / 2 2 / 0 2 / 3
Achieved risk perception levels:
0 = no effect perceived.
1 = effect perceived.
2 = effect explained.
3 = effect perceived is risk related.
other things, inappropriate pesticide use. Farmers
defined their health as “good,” according to their def-
inition of health capital (see Part I), by the simple
fact of being alive and able to maintain their labor
productivity and, thus, to support their family.
4.2.2.2. Effect statements. Experts stated that med-
ical support and treatment was sufficient and cov-
ered by the governmental health insurance SISBEN
(scoring 0, Table IX). Farmers believed that a risk
in health capital is directly related to a risk in finan-
cial capital (score 3, Table IX). For example, farmers
prefer to pay to be professionally and efficiently at-
tended in a private clinic instead of experiencing the
inadequate and time-consuming services SISBEN of-
fers for free. Thus in farmers’ opinion an adequate
health treatment is only assured through financial re-
sources.
Experts argued that farmers were well informed
about the health-damaging effect of pesticides and
measures to reduce potential health risks, but did
not act accordingly. Farmers, however, did not re-
late their illnesses to inappropriate pesticide use. Ad-
ditionally, they asserted that none of the medical
doctors had mentioned that incorrect pesticide use
might be the cause for their sicknesses (scoring 0,
Table IX).
4.2.3. Natural Capital
4.2.3.1. State. According to their definition in Part II
(see above), experts stated that farmers’ natural cap-
ital was “good.” Nevertheless, they were concerned
about future deterioration of the natural capital and
thus see a risk of decreasing productivity due to in-
appropriate management techniques and decreasing
farm sizes. Farmers think their soils are “good” but
had a limited concept of the “qualification” of soils.
4.2.3.2. Effect statements. Natural on Human. While
experts did not mention any effect of natural on
human capital, farmers tended to learn from their
observations of nature (scoring 3). The following
statements illustrate this fact. Three of nine farmers
answered the question “What effect do you think
pesticides have on plants?” with “when dosage of
pesticides is high, the growth and the strength of
the plant is affected” and “when pesticides are over-
dosed, burning of leaves is observed.” Focusing on
the effect of pesticides on biodiversity 5/9 farmers
said they had noticed the disappearance of earth-
worms and other “non damaging insects” in the
field.5
4.2.3.3. Natural on Health. The element water
turned out to be a good “indicator” for understand-
ing the system perspectives of farmers (scoring 3).
Whereas 7/9 farmers noticed water contamination by
pesticides, 1/7 specified his statement by saying that
pesticides could affect water quality because he had
observed pesticide residues in the water after apply-
ing pesticides. Another farmer (1/7) underscored that
the overuse of pesticides could lead to water contam-
ination, causing serious health risks. Three of seven
(3/7) farmers explained that pesticides washed off the
leaves, percolated through the soil, and reached the
aquifer, where they became part of the water cycle.
Finally, two farmers (2/7) did not specify further their
statements on water contamination.
4.2.3.4. Natural on Financial. From the analysis of
the experts’ interviews only an indirect statement
concerning the effect of natural on financial capital
was found: the experts tended to equate “small” with
5One of nine farmer stated that pesticides did not affect biodiver-
sity at all, while three of nine (3/9) farmers seemed to have some
difficulty in grasping the concept of biodiversity.
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“poor” farmers. Farmers, meanwhile, explained that
good agricultural production (e.g., soil productivity)
would increase their financial capital (scoring 2).
4.2.4. Financial Capital
4.2.4.1. State. Experts did not know anything about
the current financial state of farmers. Farmers them-
selves were also hesitant to rate their financial state
as “good” or “bad.”
4.2.4.2. Effect statements. As the following state-
ments reveal, the perceived effect of the financial
capital on the others also differed considerably be-
tween experts and farmers. Experts perceived the
effect of financial to human capital as risk related
(scoring 3). In contrast to that farmers only scored
2 for financial to human capital but perceived the
effect of financial to natural capital as risk related
(scoring 3) as the following statements demonstrate.
Experts stated that wealthier farmers have more so-
cial contacts, care more about the quality of their
products, are capable of explaining their problems
more precisely, and have more sophisticated agricul-
tural equipment. Experts assumed that these farm-
ers would invest money in sound techniques for
potato cultivation. In addition to this, experts think
that poorer farmers have minimal financial resources
and limited access to credit, “little” natural capi-
tal, and are additionally trapped in their social net-
works. Furthermore, they consider that those farm-
ers are also more suspicious, more traditionalist,
more religious, and also reluctant to adopt new
technologies.
However, if given the possibility to spend more
money, 4/9 farmers would not invest more in potato
production, as they fear overproduction and conse-
quently the risk of declining potato prices. Farm-
ers would prefer to try alternative means of in-
come, for example, grow other crops, invest in ani-
mal husbandry, or open a fish farm. Only one farmer
(1/9) answered that he would try to escape his de-
pendency on climatic conditions by buying parcels
in different regions and growing potatoes with dif-
ferent harvest times, thus benefiting from seasonal
market-price variations. Confronted with the hypo-
thetical situation of having less money, 4/9 farm-
ers explained that a decrease in their production
would result and they would “try to survive this even
harder situation.” Some farmers (3/9) preferred to
take out a loan or to borrow money from a relative
or a friend in order to maintain their current living
standard.
4.3. Part III: Agent Networks
As shown in Binder and Scho¨ll(16) the compari-
son of the two agent networks permits the distinction
of means and potential for interventions, and repre-
sents the social capital of the livelihood in the SMMA
analysis. The final experts’ network was a straight
line: Farmer-Market-Government-Pesticide seller-
UMATA-ICA6-Pest Producer-Farmers’ Union-
Church-University7 (Fig. 3). Farmers’ networks
were, in contrast, more diverse, as shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 5 illustrates the differences between the ex-
perts’ and the average farmer’s network (including
the standard deviation). Only the relevant differ-
ences for risk perception are discussed.
Market. The marketplace, representing cus-
tomers and intermediaries, was seen by the experts
as an element on which farmers depend, whereas
farmers seem to perceive that they influence the local
prices.
ICA-UMATA. The two governmental technical
assistance entities were judged by the experts as hav-
ing the same importance for the farmers, while farm-
ers clearly feel more connected and supported by the
ICA than by the UMATA.
Church. The experts did not believe that faith
was an important agent for the farmers, often even
forgetting to mention it in their actors list. However,
farmers consider the church to be in first or at least
third place.
Pesticide producers pesticide seller. Experts place
pesticide sellers closer to the farmer in the network,
whereas farmers place pesticide producers closer, be-
lieving producers to be of more importance to them.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This article applied the method of SMMA(16) to
investigate how pesticide management and pesticide
risk perception in LDC is related to farmers’ liveli-
hood. In doing so, we identified crucial differences
between farmers’ and experts’ mental models, ex-
plaining to some extent the lack of success of edu-
cational and intervention programs. The differences
were made explicit in the SMMA at the level of
definition of the individual capitals, ranking of the
capitals, system dynamics, and agent networks. In the
6Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario (Colombian Agronomy In-
stitute).
7The element “university” was just added to allow the farmers to
place the interviewers somewhere in the system. Results concern-
ing this agent will not be discussed any further.
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Church (4/7)
Union (3/7)
Pesticide seller (1.2)
Market (1/7) 
(potato)  
Pesticide producer (1.2)
Farmer 
(seeking health to 
benefit from it) 
UMATA (5 /7)
ICA (2/7)
Government (6/7)
University (7/7)
They just look for 
their own profit 
(2)-(7) very 
difficult to say 
UMATA (2/4) 
Church / culture (1/4)
Production company 
(2/4) 
Producer 
(market) (1/4) 
Union (3/4)  
(far away, provide 
no benefit) 
Farmer 
Pesticide seller (2/4) 
(explaining and 
providing advice) 
University (4/4) 
ICA (1/4) 
Provides many opportunities 
because they help 
Government 
(1/4) 
Fig. 4. Examples of farmers’ agent networks, where Y = 4 in the upper network, and Y = 7 in the lower network. For both networks, the
distance of each agent in the network is indicated in brackets. For all disconnected agents of the farmers’ agent system, the value 1.2 was
given.
Fig. 5. Difference in experts’ and farmers’ agent network analysis. (Experts: consolidated; Farmers: with SD.(24))
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following, first possible causes for the differences in
MMs are discussed. Furthermore, we discuss some
strengths and weaknesses of the SMMA, followed by
policy recommendations for improving educational
programs in the region. Finally, suggestions for fur-
ther research are made.
5.1. Causes for Differences Among MM
In the following, we discuss three main explana-
tions for the discrepancies between the mental mod-
els and risk perceptions of farmers and experts: (i)
the role of tradition; (ii), trust in the source of infor-
mation; and (iii) feedback on knowledge adjustment.
5.1.1. Role of Tradition and Religion
Our results indicate that in the study area farm-
ers have additional sources of information to the
ones experts believe they have. For example, reli-
gion and tradition significantly influence farmers’ risk
perception. As presented in Table VIII, some farm-
ers placed the element “church” as an element of
health capital instead of human capital. Comparable
findings concerning religion and health capital can
be found in the anthropological literature.(42–45) Fur-
thermore, this finding is in agreement with Slimak
et al.,(46) who found that respondents who believed
in the literal meaning of religious texts were less con-
cerned about global risk, whereas those who did not
believe in an afterlife were more concerned about
chemical and ecological risks.(46)
The difference in health ranking can be ex-
plained by the different definition of health capital
of farmers and experts. While farmers defined health
capital in a binary way (i.e., being alive or dead), ex-
perts had a more differentiated perspective of health
capital as continuous variable of the physical health
status. Therefore, experts placed health capital as be-
ing least important capital for farmers, as they ob-
served that farmers’ activities were reducing their
health status. In contrast, farmers stated that if they
were dead, they would not be able to work and nour-
ish their family; thus they rated this capital highest.
This implies that as long as health is only impaired,
health, as defined by farmers, is not affected. Thus
health protection information has first to clarify the
danger of a product taking farmers’ binary health
definition into account.
In addition, tradition plays an important role
when taking managerial decisions. Farmers agreed
that their parents are their main source of informa-
tion regarding soil and pesticide management. This
suggests that management habits are passed on from
generation to generation. This finding is in line with
the sociocultural perspective, which states that cul-
ture and social structures (traditions, religion, and
worldviews) might indeed significantly influence the
risk perception of agents.(46,47)
5.1.2. Trust in the Source of Information
Farmers’ placing of agents in the network was
mostly explained by traits of trust, for example, farm-
ers placed pesticide producers closer to themselves
than governmental technical assistance, commenting
that they had more trust in pesticide producers. This
result is affirmed by findings of Trumbo and McCo-
mas,(48) which state that information credibility has
an influence on risk perception.
Please note that Siegrist and Cvetkovich(49)
found high variability in approaches to defining and
measuring trust. We concentrated, as set out by Earle
and Cvetkovich,(50) on the definition of “interper-
sonal trust.”8 In our analysis we found three possi-
ble traits of trust: (i) contact intensity, (ii) experi-
ences gained concerning the quality of the informa-
tion given, and (iii) willingness to use information
from certain sources.
Regarding the first, contact intensity, findings
varied from low (governmental entities) to high (pes-
ticide producing companies). Farmers’ statements
were always relative, comparing two agents with each
other.
Farmers complained that the current contact
with governmental entities (e.g., UMATA) was crit-
ically low (see Fig. 5: UMATA was placed fur-
ther away than, e.g., pesticide producing compa-
nies). This fact can be explained by substantial reduc-
tions in the budget of governmental technical assis-
tance. Nevertheless, an example of a better and more
reliable form of governmental technical assistance
was the ICA, the technical advisors for animal hus-
bandry. These agents were placed even closer in the
agent network than pesticide producing companies
and their advice was acknowledged and trusted by
farmers.
8“Interpersonal trust relates to the perceived presence or absence
of particular traits in the source, describing much of the research
on source credibility. Social trust, in comparison refers to the
complex social processes by which people make choices and as-
sign management responsibilities to individuals, groups or orga-
nizations.”(50).
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However, farmers stated that the contact in-
tensity with pesticide production companies had in-
creased during the last few years, leading to a higher
trust in these agents. The high trust given to the pesti-
cide producers implies their responsibility as a source
of information for farmers.
Concerning the second trait of trust, we use farm-
ers’ judgments on the quality of information inferred
from their own experience. Farmers stated they had
had “bad experiences,” such as crop losses, after fol-
lowing technical advice from governmental entities.
Furthermore, the governmental technical assistance
seemed to be less informed about health and envi-
ronmental risks related to pesticide use. In a simi-
lar vein, farmers mentioned “testing” generic pesti-
cide products with active components comparable to
the ones in “label” products recommended by pesti-
cide selling companies. Farmers learned from those
kinds of “self-tests” that “too much of the product
burns the crop” and that the dosage must be higher
for generic products than for the “label” products.
These results suggest that farmers try to expe-
rience the value of the obtained information in or-
der to classify the source of information. They also
agree with the assumptions of Severtson,(51) 9 who
claims that farmers induce a shift from “abstract
information from an external sources” to “experi-
mental information.”
The third trait of trust, “willingness to use infor-
mation from certain sources,” is exemplified by farm-
ers’ and experts’ statements concerning the use of the
obtained information. This trait of trust is fostered
by the former two traits, “intensity of contact” and
“experiences regarding the quality of information,”
but also influences risk perception via one’s own in-
dependent and heuristic path.
During the interviews, experts underlined their
frustration at not being heard by the farmers with
statements like “they are just not doing what they
were told to do.” Farmers said they felt they were
not taken seriously by the experts using statements
like “we were told to wear protection clothing but not
explained why to do so.” Additionally, even if farm-
ers had been “explained why they should wear pro-
tection clothing,” they preferred to ignore the rec-
ommendation because the explanation contradicted
their own experiences.
9“There may be a continuum of informational influences with
abstract information from external sources as weaker and
experimental information as stronger, and concrete informa-
tion from external information sources as having intermediate
influence.”(51)
The effect of ignoring experts’ recommendations
is explained by Coyle(52) with the term “psychological
defensiveness,” claiming that “psychological defen-
siveness is prompted when personally relevant stim-
uli (information and experience) does not match val-
ued personal goals.”
Furthermore, some farmers said they did not
trust governmental agencies without giving a particu-
lar reason. These statements are comparable to find-
ings presented in the literature review of Trumbo and
McComas,(48) reporting that individuals and commu-
nities often perceive federal and state agencies as less
credible.
5.1.3. Feedback on Knowledge
Feedback on knowledge was found to be an im-
portant cause explaining deviations of MMs. The
feedback mechanisms analyzed relate to the social
amplification of risk introduced by Kasperson.(53)
The best example of feedback is farmers’ own
definition for their most frequently used pesticides.
From former studies,(40) we know that farmers define
pesticides as preventive (“preparativo”), cure (“cura-
tivo”), or poison (“veneno”), depending on toxicity,
price, and use frequency. Toxicity is defined by the
effectiveness and bad smell. Indications on the prod-
uct labels are mostly ignored.
This example suggests that farmers’ definitions
of products are the result of mainly three mecha-
nisms: (i) intuitive toxicology (i.e., bad smell classi-
fication), (ii) experimental knowledge (i.e., experi-
enced effectiveness of a product), gained by apply-
ing the product, and (iii) the information formally
obtained from the introducer or promoter of a prod-
uct. The existence of intuitive toxicology is affirmed
by studies of Kraus(54) and has no further influence
on information processing, such that bad smell is
not related to any other recommendation. In con-
trast, experimental knowledge feeds back on the for-
mally obtained information, leading to a changed
MM. This implies that information to which no ex-
perience can be related evokes an interruption of
this feedback mechanism. Such an example is infor-
mation on protection measures, in which people are
taught to change a habit to avoid a certain not expe-
rienced negative effect.
Hence most of the farmers’ attitudes regard-
ing pesticide protection measures were referenced
to self-constructed safety measures confirming their
own beliefs rather then being inferred from experi-
ence. These findings are affirmed by Severtson,(51)
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who found a wide range of safety thresholds among
people commenting on their attitudes related to ar-
senic risk. Similarly, the findings of Slovic(55) ques-
tion the rationality of smoking decisions, which in
his eyes: “provides a dramatic example of the diffi-
culty that experimental thinking faces in dealing with
outcomes that change very slowly over time, are re-
mote in time and are visceral in nature.” Further-
more, Lichtenberg(56) underlines that farmers who
have experienced adverse health effects of pesticide
use care about the effects of application and engage
in alternative means of pest management.
It is important to consider that the feedback
mechanism can also be interrupted if there is a time
delay between action and effect. While experts dif-
ferentiated between short- and long-term dynamics
of the system, farmers seemed to concentrate on the
immediate interactions and did not connect earlier
actions with time-delayed effects. Nevertheless ex-
perts tried to give long-term recommendations (e.g.,
concerning chronic pesticide risks), neglecting farm-
ers’ insensitivity toward this kind of information.
5.2. Improving Risk Communication
Possible recommendations emerging from the
three causes of deviating MMs found are presented
here, concentrating on the improvement of risk com-
munication.
First, the additional sources of information
found, like religion and tradition, should be consid-
ered when designing new educational programs. That
is, the target population of the planned programs
should be clearly defined, aiming at including farm-
ers who typically would be denominated as leaders
or who are household decisionmakers.
Second, the credibility of the informer has to
be ensured by directly linking the information pro-
vided to experience. The Farm Field Schools (FFS)
first introduced in Asia(57) are a first step in this
direction.
The feedback mechanisms mentioned in Section
5.1.3. should be taken into account especially for the
case of pesticide poisoning diagnostics and pesticide
safety labeling. Regarding the SISBEN, an improve-
ment in pesticide poisoning diagnostics and an obli-
gation to carry out poisoning notifications could di-
rectly raise the application of pesticide protection
measures. Regarding label improvements, the cur-
rent toxicity rankings of pesticide producers should
be linked to farmers’ definition of pesticide toxicity
(“preparativo,” “curativo,” “veneno”).
5.3. Strengths and Limitations of SMMA
We consider that the strengths of SMMA are
that it provides: (a) a structured analysis of the risk
perception problems in LDCs along with their pos-
sible causes; (b) an understanding of the relevance
of cultural elements in reasoning; (c) an approach to
understanding the relevance of different risks in re-
lation to farmers’ livelihood; and (d) an analysis of
potential causes for differing MMs leading to new op-
tions for improving risk perception and risk commu-
nication.
From the application of the SMMA, we consider
that possible limitations of the approach are that: (a)
the differing opinions of experts, specially experts of
different fields of competence are difficult to com-
pare; (b) the selection of the experts is critical for
the success of the analysis; and (c) an additional sec-
ond interview of the experts on the basis of farmers’
statements could bring additional information and
insides.
5.4. Further Research Applications
The next step of our research will be to vali-
date the obtained results with an extensive survey in
Vereda la Hoya. Since the SMMA is a new method
some aspects could be improved and additional ap-
plications can be envisioned.
As our approach required the knowledge of dif-
ferent scientific expert groups, one interesting ques-
tion could be to which extent these experts also dif-
fer regarding their mental models. This information
would help to consolidate the developed ideas on im-
proving risk communication.
Our research showed the relevance of agent net-
works for planning successful interventions. In a next
step, this analysis could be further developed by
establishing an agent network, characterizing also
the strength of the agents’ interaction. This net-
work should be developed together with the involved
agents and validated with other farmers in the region.
One possible further challenge is to develop a
culture-specific typology of farmers, comparing, for
example, smallholders in Latin America, Asia, and
Africa. This typology would allow to specify inter-
vention programs according to similarities and differ-
ences among these cultures. As mentioned before, an
adaptation to the culture-specific cognition patterns
would be required.
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